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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Anthony Hiatt appeals following the district court’s denial of his motion
for credit for time served.  On appeal, Mr. Hiatt asserts that the district court erred when
it calculated his credit for time served.  Where Mr. Hiatt filed his motions for credit for
time served in 2016, and the district court issued its order denying Mr. Hiatt’s motions
for credit for time served on March 16, 2016, the statutory language in effect at the time
the district court re-calculated the time Mr. Hiatt had served required the district court to
credit Mr. Hiatt with the discretionary time he served as a condition of his probation.
Application of the amended statutes to the facts of Mr. Hiatt’s motion does not require
the “retroactive” application rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Leary, 160
Idaho 340, 372 P.3d 404 (2016), because a motion for credit for time served may be
made at any time, and Mr. Hiatt’s motion was made after the effective date of the
statutory amendments.  To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary may have
stated, in dicta, that the plain meaning of the statutes require that credit may only be
calculated or awarded at the same time the judgment or an order revoking probation is
entered, the Court’s statutory interpretation was flawed.  Giving Mr. Hiatt credit for the
time he served as a condition of probation does not require retroactive application of the
2015 statutory amendments, and is required by the plain language of the relevant
statutes.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On May 10, 2009, Mr. Hiatt and his wife, Antonette Hiatt, got into an argument.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.2.)  The argument became
physical and, during the argument, Mr. Hiatt placed his hands around Mrs. Hiatt’s neck.
(PSI, p.2.)  Based on that allegation, Mr. Hiatt was charged by information with one
count of felony domestic violence.  (R., pp.27-282.)
After a jury convicted him of the lesser included offence of felony domestic
assault,3 Mr.  Hiatt  was sentenced to a unified term of  five years,  with two years fixed,
but the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Hiatt for 180 days.  (R., pp.113-115.)
After a successful rider, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Hiatt
on probation for five years.  (R., pp.119-125.)  A condition of Mr. Hiatt’s probation was
that he serve sixty days in the Ada County Jail, but the sixty days were suspended, to
be imposed at the discretion of his probation officer with the approval of the district
court.  (R., p.123.)
1 The designation “PSI” includes the PSI and all attachments contained in the electronic
file, including Addendums to the PSI, police reports, the mental health evaluation and
letters from family and friends in support of Mr. Hiatt.
2 This Court ordered the district court to prepare a limited Clerk’s Record.  (See Order to
Augment Prior Appeal No. 40990, entered April 4, 2016.)  The Limited Clerk’s Record
contains documents that were filed in the district court after the original Clerk’s Record
was created in the same case during a prior appeal; however, the page numbers do not
continue from that point but rather start over.  Therefore, citations to the original Clerk’s
Record will include the designation “R.”, while citations to the Limited Clerk’s Record will
include the designation “Supp. R.”
3 The jury found Mr. Hiatt guilty of domestic assault, and Mr. Hiatt stipulated that this
was his third offense in fifteen years, making it a felony.  (R., p.113.)
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On January 10, 2011, the district court approved fourteen days of discretionary
jail time upon the probation officer’s request due to “the lack of progress on probation”
by Mr. Hiatt.  (R., p.126.)
In January of 2011, a motion for probation violation was filed against Mr. Hiatt
after which he admitted that he violated a term and condition of his probation, and the
district court continued Mr. Hiatt on probation.  (R., pp.138-140, 154, 160-164.)
In 2012, another report of probation violation was filed against Mr. Hiatt which
alleged that Mr. Hiatt changed his residence without first obtaining permission from his
probation officer, twice failed to report to his probation officer, failed to maintain full-time
employment, failed to pay all of his fines, fees, and costs, associated with his wife who
was not an association approved by his probation officer, and failed to complete
requisite programming.  (R., pp.184-189, 222-224.)  After another probation violation, in
2012, the district court continued Mr. Hiatt on probation.  (R., pp.184-189, 222-224, 227-
228, 231-235.)
In 2013, a third report of probation violation was filed against Mr. Hiatt and, after
he admitted to violating his probation, on May 1, 2013, the district court entered an
order revoking probation.  (R., pp.254-256, 265-269, 267-269.)  The district court only
calculated Mr. Hiatt’s credit for time served on this probation violation as sixty-nine
days.  (R., p.268.)
Mr. Hiatt appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking probation and by failing to reduce his sentence, sua sponte.  (R., pp.270-272.)
In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Hiatt’s sentence.
State v. Hiatt, 2014 Opinion No. 415 (Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2014) (unpublished).
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In 2013, Mr. Hiatt filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a
supporting affidavit in which he asserted that he should have received credit for all of
the time he served in conjunction with the charge and the resulting sentence imposed
by the Court.  (Supplemental Record (hereinafter, “Supp. R.”), pp.13-25.)
The district court found that Mr. Hiatt was ordered to serve sixty days at the
discretion of his probation officer as a condition of probation; he was ordered to serve
fourteen days on January 10, 2011, and he served eight days before his arrest on a
probation violation warrant.  (Supp. R., pp.26-27.)  However, the court held Mr. Hiatt
was not entitled to credit for time served for the eight days of discretionary jail time and
declined to grant such credit.  (Supp. R., p.27.)  The district court calculated Mr. Hiatt
was owed 548 days of credit for time served.  (Supp. R., pp.26-29.)
Effective July 1, 2015, the statutes governing credit for time served were
amended to include credit for all time served as a condition of probation. See 2015
Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64).
In 2016, Mr. Hiatt filed another motion for credit for time served.  (Supp.
R., pp.30-38.)  In the 2016 motion, Mr. Hiatt asserted that the amendments to the
relevant code section, I.C. § 18-309, required he be given credit for 8 days of
discretionary time he spent in custody.4  (Supp. R., pp.30-38.)  The district court denied
Mr. Hiatt’s motion without a hearing.  (Supp. R., pp.41-44.)  Mr. Hiatt filed a timely notice
of appeal.  (R., pp.45-47.)
4 Mr. Hiatt requested fourteen days of credit in his pro se motion; the subsequent motion
filed by his counsel requested eight days of credit for time served, however, it appears








The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hiatt Credit For Time He Served As A
Condition Of Probation
A. Introduction
Mr. Hiatt asserts that the district court erred when it denied him credit for time he
served at the discretion of his probation officer.  Mr. Hiatt respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the order denying motion for credit for time served and remand this case
with instructions that Mr. Hiatt be given credit for time served for the eight days he
served at the discretion of his probation officer.
B.  Standard Of Review
      A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006).  On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.  An appellate court exercises free review over
questions of law. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990).
C.  The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hiatt’s Request For Credit For Time
He Served As A Condition Of Probation
Mr. Hiatt asserts that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes require the
district court to give him credit for all of the time he served as a condition of probation,
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when he was incarcerated at the discretion of his probation officer.5  The Amendments
to the two relevant statutes took effect on July 1, 2015.  Because the effective date of
the amendments was before the date the district court was asked to re-calculate credit
for time served, the district court erred in refusing to give Mr. Hiatt credit for time served
at the discretion of his probation officer.
On January 27, 2016, Mr. Hiatt filed a motion for credit for time served requesting
credit for all of the discretionary jail time he served in the Ada County Jail.  (Supp.
R., pp.30-38.)  The district court denied the motion on March 16, 2016.  (Supp.
R., pp.41-44.)  The district court acknowledged that the law governing credit for time
served as a condition of probation had been amended and noted that Mr. Hiatt had
served eight days at the discretion of his probation officer, but refused to credit Mr. Hiatt
for the time.  (Supp. R., pp.41-44.)
Idaho Code Sections 18–309 and 19-2603 govern, inter alia, credit for
incarceration ordered as a condition of probation.
As amended, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or
suspended judgment.
I.C. § 19-2603, as amended, similarly provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
5 Because a motion requesting credit for time served may be brought “at any time”
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c), credit for time served can be calculated or re-calculated at any
time.  I.C.R. 35(c).
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was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.  The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence.  The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
The amendments to both of the credit statutes became effective on July 1, 2015.
See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64).  Where Mr. Hiatt filed his motions for
credit for time served in 2016, and the district court issued its order denying Mr. Hiatt’s
motions for credit for time served on March 16, 2016, the statutory language in effect at
the time the district court re-calculated the time Mr. Hiatt had served required the district
court to credit Mr. Hiatt with the discretionary time he served as a condition of his
probation.
1. Awarding Mr. Hiatt Credit For Time Served Does Not Require Retroactive
Application Of The Statutory Amendments
Application of the amended statutes to the facts of Mr. Hiatt’s motion does not
require the “retroactive” application rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary
because a motion for credit for time served may be made at any time, and Mr. Hiatt’s
motion was made after the effective date of the statutory amendments.
In State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 372 P.3d 404 (2016), Mr. Leary claimed that
the district court erred by not applying the statutory amendments, which had not yet
been enacted at the time of its decision, to give credit for time served as a condition of
probation.  372 P.3d at 407.  The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mr. Leary’s arguments,
and held the 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 were unambiguous and
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were not retroactive. 372 P.3d at 408.  In so deciding, the Court looked at the plain
language of the statutes to hold that “the Credit Statutes do not include an express
declaration of retroactive effect.” Id.  The Court went on to say that the amendment did
not apply to those “person[s] whose judgment was previously entered or imposed” and
similarly found that I.C. § 19-2603 was “devoid of any indication that it should apply to
persons who were sentenced or whose probation was revoked before the amendment
was effective.” Id. (emphasis in original).
To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary may have indicated, in dicta,
that the plain meaning of the statutes require that credit may only be calculated or
awarded at the same time the judgment or an order revoking probation is entered, the
Court’s statutory interpretation was flawed.  The Leary Court’s reliance on the language
of I.C. § 18-309 (despite the absence of such language in I.C. § 19-2603), applicable to
a “person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed” as language limiting the
time during which the amendments became applicable to those persons who were
sentenced or whose probation was revoked after the amendments were effective, was
misplaced.  The plain language of I.C. §§ 18-309(2) and 19-2603, in its common and
ordinary meaning, does not restrict a credit calculation to the time the judgment is
actually entered or the time when the suspended sentence is imposed.  The language
“is entered or imposed” is not mandating when the defendant’s credit can be calculated
or given, but is describing who receives the credit.  The correct application of these
statutes requires the district court to consider the law in effect at the time it considers
and decides the motion for credit for time served.  Further, such an interpretation would
10
be consistent with the Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a court to calculate the appropriate
credit for time served at any time. See I.C.R. 35(c).
Furthermore, the facts of Leary are distinguishable from those in Mr. Hiatt’s case.
In Leary, the defendant asked the Court to find error where the district court denied the
motion for credit for time served prior to the effective date of the 2015 amendments.
The Court found the statutory amendments were not retroactive back to 2013, when
Mr. Leary filed his motion for credit for time served and the district court ruled on it.
Although the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the statutes were not retroactive, and, in
dicta found that the amendments would not apply to a defendant sentenced or whose
probation was revoked before the amendment was effective, the Idaho Supreme Court
has not since decided a case such as Mr. Hiatt’s, where the motions for credit were filed
after the effective date of the statutes.6
The Court should find the amended versions of the credit for time served statutes
apply to those calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective,
and no further analysis regarding retroactivity is necessary.
6 In an unpublished decision, State v. Taylor, 2016 Unpublished Opinion, No. 647
(Aug. 18, 2016), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “[t]he district court correctly
applied the law in effect at the time Thomas filed his motions for credit for time served.”
C.f., State v. Alvarez, 2016 WL 5416318 (Sept. 28, 2016) (unpublished) (holding that
the defendant’s credit for time served was calculated prior to the effective date of the
amendment and the application of the amendment to the credit for time served statute is
not retroactive).
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2. The Plain Language Of The 2015 Amendments Requires The District
Court To Calculate Credit Pursuant To The Amendments If They Were In
Effect At The Time Credit Was Calculated
The amendments to the credit statutes mandating that a defendant receive credit
for time spent incarcerated as a condition of his probation became effective on July 1,
2015. See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64).  At the time the district court
entered its order calculating Mr. Hiatt’s credit for time served, the 2015 amendments to
the credit statutes were in effect.  The applicable credit for time served statutes are not
ambiguous.  The plain language of the 2015 statutory amendments requires the district
court to calculate credit pursuant to the amendments if they were effective at the time
the court calculates time served.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001).  The Idaho Supreme
Court has outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation.  “The interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.”
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  “A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of
more than one reasonable construction.  An unambiguous statute would have only one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  “If
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law
as written.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “We have consistently held that
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent
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of the legislature.” Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The asserted purpose for
enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or void “an unambiguous
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when
construed as written.” Id. at 896.  “If the statute as written is socially or otherwise
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.” Id. at 893 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The language of the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes clearly require
credit for all time spent incarcerated:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended
judgment.
. . .
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (amending, respectively, I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603)
(emphasis added).
A credit calculation does not necessarily occur when the district court revokes
probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603.  The plain language of that statute provides only
that credit shall be awarded, but places no conditions on when it must be calculated.
The first sentence of the statute reads as follows, “When the court finds that the
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defendant has violated the terms and conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has
been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.”  In common
parlance, the term “when” can mean “in the event that” and is not necessarily a time
restriction.7  It is only in the third sentence that the calculation of credit for time served is
mentioned, however the plain language does not require calculation of such credit at
any date certain.  The provision about when the district court revokes probation does
not impact on the credit calculation, since the credit calculation is addressed in a
different part of the statute. Thus, the use of the term “when” in the first sentence does
not create a time limitation of what time credit for time served may be calculated in the
third sentence.
Finally, the same analysis can be applied to the plain meaning of “when” in
section 18-309 because there is no requirement that the district court calculate the
appropriate amount of credit for time served when entering a judgment, whether an
original judgment or an order revoking probation. See I.C.R. 33(b); see also I.C. § 19-
2519.  Thus, the Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a motion to be made for a credit
calculation at any time is both necessary and consistent.  As such, I.C.R. 35(c) and the
statutes governing credit for time served can be read in harmony.  Furthermore, if this
Court finds the term “when” is ambiguous in either statute, the rule of lenity must be
applied.8
7 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
8 The rule of lenity states that in construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846,
847 (Ct. App. 2011).
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The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion
to correct the calculation of credit at any time, thus the time the judgment is entered or
executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation.  I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently made clear, “the language of
I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as
in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court
give the appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).
“This means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as
defined by the statute.9 Id.  Thus, the focus of the credit statutes is not on the judgment
itself, but rather, on the defendant—the person against whom that judgment was
entered. See also I.C. § 18-309(2) (“In computing the time of imprisonment when . . .
[the] sentence has been suspended and is later imposed, the person against whom the
judgment is entered or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment . . . .”) (emphasis
added); I.C. § 19-2603 (The defendant shall  receive credit  for  time served .  .  .  for  any
time served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.”) (emphasis added).
Further, the Idaho Legislature did not include a cut-off date for the courts in
determining credit for time served.  While the Legislature certainly knew of the broad
language of I.C.R. 35(c) (allowing a motion for credit for time served to “be made at any
time”) and knew how to draft language specifying the date a defendant/appellant’s
conviction will be covered by the statute (See, i.e., I.C. § 19-870(a) (requiring the state
9 While the defendant in Moore was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration, and
Mr. Hiatt is seeking credit for time served as a condition of probation, the reasoning of
Moore applies equally to all periods of incarceration identified in the credit statutes.
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appellate public defender to provide representation to appellants “convicted on or after
September 1, 1998”), it did not do so, instead enacting statutory amendments
broadening the circumstances in which courts “shall” give credit for “any time served.”
See I.C. §§ 18-309(2), 19-2603.
Finally, the Court is obligated to ensure the defendant is receiving “credit for the
correct amount of time actually served . . . .  The [courts do] not have discretion to
award credit for time served that is either more or less than that.” See Moore, 156
Idaho at 21 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the Court’s dicta in Leary essentially requires
the district court to apply an improper calculation of credit due based on when the
judgment was entered or executed.
Because the effective date of the amendments was prior to the date the district
court’s order calculating credit for time served was filed, the district court erred in
refusing to give Mr. Hiatt credit for time served as a condition of probation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hiatt respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for all
time he was incarcerated on this case, including the time served at the discretion of his
probation officer as a condition of probation.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2017.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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